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DISCRETION. By Milton Handler. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1957. Pp. 151. $3.00.
SCHOLARSHIP about antitrust has been, on the whole, ephemeral. The
Supreme Court speaks and soon the law reviews are teeming with interpreta-
tions, predictions, recriminations. But let a year pass and yesterday's de-
cision is forgotten as the pack takes off, in full cry, after today's sensation.
There seems to be neither time nor inclination for the long view. With only
a few exceptions, the role of antitrust theoretician has been assumed by econo-
mists. And aside from one recent outbreak of introspection by committee,'
antitrust lawyers have been content to abide by the injunction that sufficient
unto the day is the evil thereof. It is, therefore, a matter of some moment
when a scholar-practitioner of experience and standing chooses to give his
reflections on antitrust theory the permanence and weight that hard covers
imply.
In this series of three lectures delivered at the University of Buffalo School
of Law, Professor Milton Handler of Columbia University sets down "ideas
on certain dynamic aspects of antitrust law which have 'fascinated [him]
during the past three decades."2 These ideas seem to converge in a single
dominant theme: application of the antitrust laws, whether under sections
one or two of the Sherman Act or under sections three or seven of the Clayton
Act "must be animated by a rule of reason whose scope and significance should
be measured by the statutory purposes it is designed to effectuate."3 So viewed,
Mr. Handler's second and third lectures, dealing with exclusive arrangements
and mergers, merely illustrate his thesis. For the text of his sermon we must
look to the first lecture, "The Judicial Architects of the Rule of Reason."
There Mr. Handler examines the views of six Supreme Court Justices-
Peckham, White, Taft, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone--who, he says, are the
"outstanding representatives of the main schools of antitrust thought."4 He
hopes that this examination will reveal "the basic contours of our modern
law." 5 In my opinion, it fails signally to do so.
Mr. Handler's approach may have largely precluded his saying anything
meaningful about his subject. Comparison of Judge A's statement of "the
1. REPoRT OF THE ATroRlET GExERAx's NATIONAL CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS (1955).
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law" with Judge B's is not likely to be significant apart from the facts of the
cases in which each stated his views. Particularly is this likely to be true if,
when Judge A says X and Judge B says Y, it is assumed that X and Y are
different. Mr. Handler repeatedly indulges in this assumption, with unfortu-
nate results for his analysis.
In discussing early attempts to give content to the broad language of the
Sherman Act, Mr. Handler, dismissing Peckham's literalism in Trans-
Missouri,6 contrasts Taft's words in Addyston 7 with those of White in
Standard Oil." Taft had said in effect that only restraints which are ancillary
to a lawful purpose are legal and that nonancillary restraints, reasonable or
not, are illegal. White, on the other hand, said that the legality of all restraints
is to be measured by their reasonableness. Mr. Handler apparently thinks the
distinction significant. But his emphasis on verbal formulations obscures not
only the essential identity of the problem with which Taft and White were
grappling but also the striking similarity of their solutions. Both were trying
to construct a rule to define forbidden conduct. Both rejected Peckham's tech-
nique of making the phrase "restraint of trade" carry the whole load of
definition. Both ended up saying that some restraints are legal and some are
not. Taft said, if the restraint is ancillary, it is legal; White said, if it is
reasonable, it is legal. But what is an ancillary restraint? It is a restraint
which is incidental to a dominant, legal purpose. Its characterization as ancillary
rests on a finding of necessary incidence to some justifiable activity in which
the parties are trying to engage. And whatever the process of deciding
whether there is such an activity and whether it is justifiable, the result, pre-
sumably, is labelled "reasonable." Or start at the other end. When is a re-
straint reasonable? When the parties are trying to do something whose social
utility is thought to outweigh the impairment to competition which it causes.
This determination is based on evaluation of the dominant purpose or effect
of the parties' conduct. If this dominant purpose or effect is to do something
other than restrain for the sake of reducing competition, and we think the
end worth encouraging, we call the restraint "ancillary"--or, again, reasonable.
In short, a start at constructing a theory for applying section one of the Sher-
man Act can be made with. either Taft's or White's verbal formulation.
Which one is used is unimportant; it is the beginning but scarcely the end
of wisdom to recognize that all commercial conduct restrains and that the
legality of any given restraint depends on someone's view of benefit and det-
riment to something or other. A little more talk about the "something or
other" would have been welcome.
The statements of six Supreme Court Justices are, I think, not the most
promising of bases for an examination of what Mr. Handler calls "the comple-
mentary roles of rule and discretion" in the administration of the Sherman Act.
6. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
7. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
8. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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But however that may be, no such examination, even on Mr. Handler's terms,
can be very useful that fails to account for the ambitious attempt to formulate
per se rules of illegality, most broadly demonstrated by Mr. Justice Douglas
in Socony-Vacuwmt.9 One passing text reference is all that decision gets.10
Apparently, Mr. Handler does not care for per se rules because he thinks
them too restrictive. Although this is not the place for reappraising the price-
fixing dogma, a more accurate criticism might be that the Socony-Vacuum rule
fails not because it is too restrictive (which implies that the rule is consistently
employed), but because it is too broad to be workable. Later Supreme Court
and lower court decisions indicate that it is simply not true that "any combina-
tion which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity""
or that "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in inter-
state ... commerce is illegal per se."' 2 If we look to what courts have done
rather than said, it becomes apparent that the price-fixing dogma, as well
as the related doctrine that concerted refusals to deal are illegal per se, is
no more than a procedural device for shifting the burden of justification to
defendants once their conduct has been shown to evidence a design to produce
an impairment of "automatic" price determination by "market forces" -in
other words, a departure from the economists' model of pure competition.
The per se rules are simply ignored in many situations where literally they
apply. Only the most mechanical reading of the cases supports Ir. Handler's
generalization that "the authorities upholding loose-knit arrangements are
extremely sparse, deal with the sui generis states of fact, and have little
precedential force.'
3
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
10. P. 25.
11. 310 U.S. at 221.
12. Id. at 223.
13. P. 26. Mr. Handler buttresses this statement by footnote citation to four Supreme
Court cases, the last of which was decided in 1933. He ignores, in this context, Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945);
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). Each of
these cases, whether in the government's "won!' or "lost" column, is in some respects
an authority "upholding loose-knit arrangements," if by that term Mr. Handler still
means arrangements not involving corporate affiliation. Of course, if cases in the lower
courts are inspected, the problem becomes one of selecting a representative few of recent
vintage and special interest. Without any attempt to be exhaustive, one might consider:
Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1949);
Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949); United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; see also United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684
(N.D. Ohio 1956). Each of these decisions leaves in effect "loose-knit arrangements"
which fall within the sweeping proscription of the Socony-Vacuum dicta.
Mr. Handler's view comes down to little more than that the government wins more
§ 1 cases than it loses.
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Further, in his discussion of the evolution of section one doctrine, Mr. Handler
omits consideration of what may well be a most significant factor. The Sher-
man Act is a criminal statute, and the offense under section one is typically
treated as an application of conspiracy doctrines. In order to instruct juries in
criminal cases, judges must articulate the law with some precision. It is hardly
an accident that the per se rules, representing as they do an attempt to
import precision into Sherman Act administration, were chiefly enunciated in
rulings on the correctness of jury instructions in two criminal cases: Trenton
Potteries,14 about which Mr. Handler says little, and Socony-Vacuum, about
which he says less. And the Nash case,15 which is surely one of the half-dozen
most significant section one decisions, rates only one reference in a footnote.
There, its holding is summarized as follows: "[H]eld that Sherman Act con-
spiracy was punishable without an overt act."'16 That is true. It is also true
14. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
15. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
16. P. 86 n.107. A footnote may be the appropriate place to comment on the apparatus
accompanying Mr. Handler's lectures. The text of the lectures occupy sixty-seven pages.
The notes, which are at the end of the book, occupy seventy-seven pages. About twenty
of these pages are given over to six omnibus notes, listing the antitrust opinions written,
and decisions participated in, by Mr. Handler's six Justices. Each case is capsulized in
a few words, usually too few to convey anything unless the reader is already familiar
with the decision. It is unfortunate that the prodigious labor which must have been
invested in constructing these notes was not instead expended in ways not so closely
resembling existing mechanical research aids in the antitrust field. In particular, it is
unfortunate that a little more care was not taken with the occasional note undertaking
to discuss a particular case rather than to list a string of them. For example, in note
172, the omnium gatherum of Stone's antitrust work, Mr. Handler pauses, at p. 101,
to discuss the important decision in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
He says:
"In Apex..., Stone denied a manufacturer the right to use antitrust to curb labor's
abuse of power, leaving to other laws the policing of union activities. Since Apex,
the antitrust liability of unions has been limited to their cooperation with industrial
groups to suppress market competition. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
325 U.S. 797 (1945)."
Of course, United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), not Apex, resulted in the
drastic limitation of the Sherman Act's applicability to labor activities. Mr. Handler
seems to have misconceived the import of Apex. The Apex rationale leaves ample room
for striking down labor activities aimed at the destruction of commercial competition.
It was, however, abandoned the next year in Hutcheson, over Stone's protest (formally
a concurrence and therefore so designated by Mr. Handler, p. 104 n.172).
In the same note, at p. 103, Mr. Handler touches on conspiracy and "conscious
parallelism." He states that misinterpretation of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939), "led to the notion that conscious parallelism was the substantive
equivalent of conspiracy-a notion now happily discarded. Theatre Enterprises v. Para-
mount [Film] Distrib[uting] Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954)." As authority, Mr. Handler cites
the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAi's NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 37-40 (1955) and two of his own recent articles, Handler, Recent Antitrust Develop-
ments, 9 THE RECoRD 171, 173-75 (1954) ; Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy,
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that Marbury v. Madison held that the issuance of a writ of mandamus -to the
Secretary of State is not within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
I have suggested that Mr. Handler's tendency to take at face value what
the Supreme Court says it is doing in antitrust cases often blunts his analysis.
Within the confines of section one decisions, two examples among several seem
worth special attention. First, he states that "actually there was no real con-
flict among the four trade association cases."117 He suggests that the cases are
factually distinguishable and that therefore their diametric results do not
reflect division within the Court concerning the principle to be applied. Be-
cause of the importance of these cases in the development of section one doctrine,
the point merits examination.
Two of the cases, Hardwood 18 and Maple Flooring,9 arose in very similar
settings and should therefore provide a fair test of the validity of Mr. Handler's
generalization. I think that the two cases do not reflect variant views on the
evidence presented (as Mr. Handler suggests) but rather differences on mat-
ters of economic policy-which is to say, differences in legal doctrine. Hard-
wood represents the view that a trade association may not lawfully make it
easy for its members to achieve price uniformity or stability by circulating data
about past transactions which may be used as a basis for restricting output
and fixing prices. Maple Flooring represents the view, advanced by Brandeis
in his Hardwood dissent,20 that it is better to permit such activity, even at the
cost of lessening price competition, than to repress it, thereby encouraging
competitors to accomplish once and for all by merger what they would other-
wise do sporadically by looser forms of collaboration. Of the five Justices who
sat in both cases, only one-Van Devanter-voted with the majority in both.
Taft and McReynolds, who were with the majority in condemning the ar-
1953 ABA ANTITRUST SEc. REP. 38, 42. I have examined these authorities and they
appear to bear out Mr. Handler's statement. However, the decision in Theatre
Enterprises does not. That case held only that it was not error for a trial court to refuse to
direct a verdict for plaintiff in a treble damage action on the basis of the prima facie
effect of a decree adverse to defendants in a former government action plus a showing
that each defendant followed an identical policy of refusing to deal with plaintiff. Even
if there had been evidence from which a jury could find direct agreement among the
defendants, that would not have compelled the direction of a verdict for plaintiff. The
question would still have been for the jury, as the Court held it was here. One wonders
why the Court bothered to grant certiorari in this profoundly insignificant case, especially
following Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
929 (1952), which, had certiorari been granted, might have compelled solution of the
problem which Mr. Handler thinks was solved by Theatre Enterprises.
17. P. 21.
18. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
19. Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
20. 257 U.S. at 418-19. Mr. Handler quotes a passage from Brandeis's opinion to
this effect, p. 20, but on the very next page tells us that this was just an argument
about facts.
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rangements in Hardwood, dissented from the decision condoning the arrange-
ments in Maple Flooring. Holmes and Brandeis, who dissented in Hardwood,
were with the majority in Maple Flooring. That hardly seems like a dispute
about facts. True, Stone, who wrote the opinion in Maple Flooring, said that
the cases were reconcilable. That seems to settle the point for Mr. Handler.
Interested readers will want to compare Brandeis's dissent in Hardwood and
draw their own conclusions.
In analyzing the Cracking case, 2' Mr. Handler seems once more to confuse
appearance with reality. The Court upheld an agreement among four com-
panies holding dominant patents on processes for increasing the gasoline yield
of crude petroleum by "cracking"-applying heat and pressure to the re-
siduum after ordinary distillation. The contracting parties purported to elimi-
nate a patent deadlock by pooling the patents; minimum royalties were fixed
and the proceeds were shared among the collaborators. This is clearly a Socony-
Vacuum "price-affecting" activity as to gasoline. Mr. Handler agrees and seems
to think that the Cracking case would be differently decided in the light of So-
cony-Vacuum. His position rests on what Brandeis said in his opinion in the
Cracking case. The Justice took the position that the agreement was lawful be-
cause gasoline made by the cracking process still had to face the competition of
uncracked gasoline. This Mr. Handler generalizes into what he calls a "con-
centric circle" theory: "Treating the boundaries of the market as the outside
and the combine as the inside circle, there is no violation if the smaller circle
remains at a respectable distance from the outer periphery. '22 The suggestion,
apparently, is that so long as enough uncracked gasoline is available to com-
pete with the cracked variety, parties to the pooling arrangement may reduce
competition in cracked gasoline inter sese. The trouble with Mr. Handler's
figure of speech is that it is irrelevant to the economic facts of the Cracking
case. Consumers do not differentiate between cracked and uncracked gasoline.
Nor do the two compete in the sense that buyers have a preference for one or
the other. Wholesalers and jobbers do not care how gasoline is made. Con-
trary to Mr. Handler's analysis, neither cracked nor uncracked gasoline is a
"thing." Cracking is, from the economist's viewpoint, a reduction in the cost
of refining gasoline. Its value is measured not by what will be paid for cracked
as against uncracked gasoline but by the increase in the yield of gasoline
refined from crude oil achieved by using the cracking process. The rationale
of the Cracking case is not that people may agree on price if the "thing" whose
price they are fixing competes with some other "thing. '23 It is rather that
under some circumstances a purpose to eliminate a patent deadlock will justify
an arrangement that affects price. In terms of the analysis suggested earlier,
the defendants have successfully borne the burden of justifying an arrange-
21. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
22. P. 20.
23. Mr. Handler seems to be under a similar misapprehension about Board of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). P. 19. But see p. 94 n.130.
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ment which is prima facie illegal because price-affecting.2 Socony-Vacuum
does not seem to have changed that.
2 5
Generalizations founded on flawed analysis of particulars are not likely to
be very helpful. Mr. Handler's are no exception. If there is any consistency
in what courts have been doing with section one of the Sherman Act, or any set
of principles by which to discriminate between better and worse decisions,
neither has been made manifest by Mr. Handler. And neither can be revealed
without at the very least, and as a starting point, a detailed re-examination of
the section one cases, based on economic as well as legal analysis.
Weak generalizations are not cured by leaving off generalizing; they are only
palliated. And surely the time for palliation in the antitrust field is over. Anti-,
trust is, after all, pre-eminently an area of common-law development, where
one must work case by case from the particular to the general. But it is
common law with a difference, for antitrust demands analysis of facts far more
complex than those typically involved in litigation and the drawing of infer-
ences for which common sense and everyday experience give little help. It
calls, in short, for application of a body of specialized knowledge--economics
and, more particularly, price theory. Without that application talk about anti-
trust doctrine is just noise.
Within the broad framework of the Sherman Act and the scarcely less
broad framework of the Clayton Act, the courts have for the last sixty-seven
years been attempting to put together a body of decisional law, with only
intermittent recognition that it is both difficult and necessary to define ends
and to identify means appropriate to those ends. It is important that this work
of the courts be criticized with all the help that economic theory can give and
with the combination of fidelity to detail and imaginative exegesis that char-
acterizes legal scholarship at its best. This is important not simply because of
the intellectual challenge-although that would be justification enough. It is
important because antitrust is this country's unique contribution to the con-
cept of a free society, because it would be a major catastrophe if antitrust
development were seriously restricted or perverted beyond what has already
occurred and because that development can be as easily damaged by inad-
vertence as by design.
Mr. Handler's book does not make a start at the kind of analysis we need.
To expect the appearance of antitrust's Wigmore would be premature. But it
is cause for genuine regret that we must wait a while longer for its Thayer.
HERBERT L. PACKERt
24. It would unduly lengthen this review to examine in detail the facts in the
Craclng case, which are set forth in the district court opinion. United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 33 F.2d 617 (N.D. Ill. 1929). It appears, however, that defendants had much
more of a strangle hold on the use and licensing of cracking processes than Brandeis's
opinion indicates and also that their claimed purpose of avoiding a patent deadlock may
have been only a cloak for cartelization, since it was by no means clear that their patents
were mutually infringing. Id. at 625-26.
25. See cases cited note 13 supra, particularly Transparent-Wrap and Lyophile-
Cryochem.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Stanford University.
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